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ABSTRACT 
 
This note gives a method of determining the long-run equilibrium output of a firm operating under 
imperfect competition that differs from standard methods of output determination and reveals properties of the 
equilibrium that standard methods conceal.  This method requires a basic cost-effectiveness condition to hold, 
which leads to a highly elastic demand.  If we strengthen that condition a bit, long-run equilibrium under free 
entry and exit becomes indistinguishable from a long-run equilibrium under perfect competition, even though 
products are differentiated and the condition given by Rosen for perfect competition with product differentiation 
fails to hold. 
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A COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM WITH PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This note gives a method of finding the long-run general equilibrium output of a firm operating under 
imperfect competition that differs from standard methods of output determination and reveals properties of the 
equilibrium that standard methods conceal.1  Let X be a product supplied by a firm under oligopoly or 
monopolistic competition, with long-run general equilibrium output, xe.  Suppose there is a related good, Y, sold 
under perfect competition or at least under competitive pricing, with price equal to minimum average cost in 
long-run equilibrium.2  For example, X might be a differentiated version of a good or service and Y a generic 
version.  When a cost-effectiveness condition is met, xe will be where the average cost of Y reaches its minimum 
or where the production function for Y displays constant returns to scale.  This is true as long as X and Y are 
viable and the cost-effectiveness condition holds.  Differentiating a product does not then change its long-run 
equilibrium output at the level of the firm, which is entirely determined by technical properties of the production 
function for Y.   
Moreover, the production function for X displays decreasing returns to scale at xe, even though this is not 
true of the rent-inclusive average cost of X.  Thus firm size is not too small nor is there excess capacity, and 
product demand is highly elastic.  If we strengthen the cost-effectiveness condition a bit, long-run equilibrium 
under free entry and exit becomes indistinguishable from a perfectly competitive equilibrium, even though 
products are differentiated, and the basic condition given by Rosen [1974] for product differentiation to be 
compatible with perfect competition fails to hold.  If we think of a product as a bundle of attributes in the manner 
of Lancaster [1966, 1971], Rosen’s condition is that each product be a different combination of the same 
attributes.  Perfect competition in the supply of each attribute could then result in perfect competition in the 
supply of products.  Firms would be price takers even though no two supply exactly the same good or service.  
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Here each firm’s differentiated product is assumed to have a unique attribute, and Rosen’s argument therefore 
fails to apply.  
II. Basic Assumptions and Results 
 
Let Px and Py be the demand prices of X and Y and x be the output of X by the supplier of this good.  X 
and Y are assumed to be measured in the same well-defined output units, and with x plotted on the horizontal 
axis, ACy is the long-run average cost of Y that a supplier of Y would face.  It is assumed to take the 
conventional U shape with a minimum at x = x*.  Let ACRx be the “rent-inclusive” long-run average cost of x.  
This is long-run average cost inclusive of all rents earned in the supply of X that persist over the long run.  
These include the rent to the supplier’s market position—when this is protected by entry barriers—as well as 
the earnings of product-specialized inputs over and above the opportunity costs of these inputs in supplying 
other goods.  If all inputs are mobile between firms—including alternative possible suppliers of X—the latter 
rents are part of the opportunity cost of a firm supplying X.  Thus when inputs are mobile between firms, and 
market positions can be freely bought and sold, rent-inclusive and opportunity costs will be the same for each 
firm.   
This is the assumption made here.  A firm will then supply X over the long run if and only if it expects to 
be able to produce where Px ≥ ACRx, but long-run competitive pressures will also force Px ≤ ACRx to hold at each 
x.  If it survives in long-run equilibrium, the firm supplying X will maximize profit where Px = AC
R
x—and thus 
where its demand is tangent to ACRx—and the firm supplying Y will maximize profit where Py = ACy = MCy, 
where MCy is the marginal cost of Y.  The outcomes, Px > AC
R
x or Py > ACy, can occur only in the short run 
when sellers are able to earn disequilibrium or entrepreneurial profits (quasi-rents) that attract entry and are 
competed away over the long run via expansion of supply by competitors. 
Production of X is assumed to use product-specialized inputs, which add value to X, but are not used to 
produce Y.  Let Fx be a fixed cost of X in the form of rent to the supplier’s market position and to its product-
specialized inputs.  Then ACRx = ACx + Fx/x, where ACx is the average cost of X, exclusive of this rent.  (In 
general, ACx and ACy are not the same.)  A differentiated product is assumed to possess unique attributes, 
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features, or properties whose cost-effective supply requires inputs specialized to these unique elements and thus 
to the product.  For example, suppose a restaurant supplies cuisine with a unique flavor and ambience.  Its 
product-specialized inputs are its recipes, together with the tacit knowledge and the talent—embodied in a 
master chef and his/her team—used to create the cuisine from the recipes.  These inputs could be bought by 
another owner who would acquire the ability to supply the unique cuisine in question.  Thus the rent earned by 
these product-specialized inputs is part of the opportunity cost of the restaurant supplying the cuisine that they 
produce.  The recipes, tacit knowledge, and talent in question are fixed stocks, which can be bought and sold, 
and their remuneration is therefore a cost that is fixed or “quasi-fixed”, in the sense that it does not vary with 
output once a decision has been made to produce a product.   
Because production of X uses product-specialized inputs that are not used to produce Y and because the 
supplier of X may be able to exercise market power, Px > Py will hold.  In long-run general equilibrium, (Px  
Py) ≥ (ACRx  ACy) must also hold for the firm supplying X if ACRx and ACy are evaluated at x = xe.  Since Px = 
ACRx in equilibrium, (Px  Py) < (ACRx  ACy) would imply that Py > ACy is possible.  In general, either (Px  Py) 
> (ACRx  ACy) or (Px  Py) = (ACRx  ACy) can hold, equality implying that xe = x*.  Figures (a) and (b) 
illustrate these possibilities.  In Figure (a), the equilibrium price and output of X are assumed to be at E1 where 
xe < x* and (Px  Py) > (ACRx  ACy).  In Figure (b), equilibrium price and output are at E2, where xe = x*, and 
thus (Px  Py) = (ACRx  ACy).  In traditional monopolistic competition [Chamberlin 1933], E1 and E2 are two 
possible points of tangency between demand and ACRx. 
E2 is the outcome under the cost-effectiveness condition below and is the more likely outcome under 
free entry and exit because only one product in the economy needs to satisfy that condition.  Suppose there is a 
third product, Z, that is viable in long-run equilibrium with equilibrium output, z = ze > 0 and rent-inclusive 
average cost, ACRz.  When Z is scaled in such a way that Pz = (Px  Py), suppose that ACRz is no greater than 
(ACRx  ACy).  Roughly speaking, this means that one can add value to Y externally, by supplying a separate 
product, Z, as efficiently as one can add value internally, by producing a unit of X instead of a unit of Y.   
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More precisely, scale Z as above and assume that whenever x takes on a value at which ACRx is 
downward-sloping and demand is such that Px = AC
R
x, there is a value of z at which: 
                                                          ACRz ≤ (ACRx  ACy)                                                                       (1). 
for the indicated values of x and z.  Given this, suppose that long-run general equilibrium prevails.  Then Px = 
ACRx and Pz = AC
R
z.  If (1) holds as well, (Px  Py) = Pz = ACRz ≤ (ACRx  ACy).   Since (Px  Py) < (ACRx  ACy) 
implies Py > ACy, (Px  Py) = (ACRx  ACy) must hold.  By equating prices with long-run rent-inclusive average 
costs, the market brings about xe = x* when (1) holds, where x* is the output at which ACy reaches its minimum 
value and at which: 
Py = MCy = ACy,                                                                        (2).  
where MCy is the marginal cost of Y.   
 Here x* is also the output at which the production function for Y exhibits constant returns to scale.  Its 
value depends only on technical properties of that function, and the equilibrium outputs of X and Y are the same 
at the firm level.  As a result, xe will be invariant to shifts in demand as long as the supplier of X can cover its 
costs and at least one product is available that satisfies (1).  Demand shifts will affect Px and the rent earned 
from supplying X, as well as the number of firms in the X industry, but not xe. 
 Let T be any product other than X, Y, or Z.  If output units of T are scaled in such a way that its price, Pt, 
equals (Px  Py), suppose that T does not satisfy (1).  But then Pt = (Px  Py) = (ACRx  ACy) < ACRt, and T 
cannot survive in long-run equilibrium.  Thus if one product that is viable in long-run equilibrium meets the 
cost-effectiveness condition, all viable products other than X and Y must satisfy this condition.  Moreover, 
suppose that no product meeting the cost-effectiveness condition exists initially.  Then it will be profitable in 
the short run to introduce such a product, Z, since with the above scaling, Pz = (Px  Py) > (ACRx  ACy) ≥ ACRz 
or  Pz > AC
R
z.  There is no reason why such a product should not also be viable over the long run. 
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III. More on the Nature of Equilibrium. 
 
 If we measure returns to scale using ACx rather than AC
R
x, we remove the effect of Fx on economies of 
scale.  At x = x* = xe, ACx could therefore be constant or upward-sloping, even if AC
R
x is downward-sloping. 
Let Lex = (Px – MCx)/Px be the Lerner index of market power for X.  When the supplier of X faces fixed input 
prices and uses no indivisible inputs other than those that are specialized to X, measuring returns to scale from 
ACx is the same as measuring them from the production function for X.  If Rx denotes returns to scale in the 
production of X at any given output—or the percentage increase in x that results from increasing each input by 
one percent—Rx = ACx/MCx.  At any given x, it would be reasonable to expect production returns to scale to be 
at least as great for a more homogeneous version of a product as for a more differentiated version.  Returns to 
scale increase as a product becomes more standardized and as its production process becomes more routinized.  
Thus ACx/MCx ≤ ACy/MCy at any given x. 
 Suppose then that differentiating the firm’s product (supplying X rather than Y) does not raise returns to 
scale at any output, when these returns are measured as ACx/MCx and ACy/MCy.  As a result, MCx ≥ ACx at x = 
xe = x*.  There is no excess capacity in production of X nor is firm size too small.  If fx = Fx/Pxx is the share of 
product-specialized rent in product value, we have: 
   Lex ≤ fx,                                                                               (3).      
when both Lex and fx are evaluated at xe = x*.  Thus when competitive pressures on X are “strong”, in the sense 
that they keep fx low, these same pressures will ensure approximate marginal-cost pricing.  The supplier of X 
will be producing where ACx is constant or upward-sloping, reflecting constant or decreasing returns to scale in 
production.  If ACRx then slopes downward at x*, it does so solely because Fx is positive.   
 In the simplest case, Lex equals one over the elasticity of demand for X at the profit maximum.  Thus if fx 
is no more than 10 percent or .1 (more generally ), the elasticity of demand will be at least 10 (more generally 
1/).  This may seem like a high elasticity, and we therefore want to investigate the effect on equilibrium in the 
X industry of strengthening (1).  To this end, let x** be the value of x at which ACRx reaches its minimum, and 
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suppose as above that x* ╪ x**.  Since x* > x** would require an equilibrium where ACRx is upward-sloping, 
x** > x* must hold.   
 Suppose then that we replace (1) with a slightly stronger condition.  Whenever x takes on a value at 
which ACRx is downward-sloping and demand is such that Px = AC
R
x, there is a value of z at which: 
                                                          ACRz ≤ min. (ACRx  ACy),                                                            (1a). 
 
where min. (ACRx  ACy) is the minimum value of (ACRx  ACy) over all x at which ACRx is downward-sloping.  
In long-run equilibrium this includes all x between x* and x**.  In (1a), Z is again scaled in such a way that Pz = 
(Px  Py) at the above value of x where Px = ACRx.  In equilibrium, this is x = x*. 
 Since ACy is upward-sloping over the range between x* and x**, it follows that (AC
R
x  ACy) is smaller 
at x** than at x*.  The vertical distance between ACy and AC
R
x falls as x increases from x* to x**.  Thus (1) 
must hold with a strict inequality at x* and as a result, the supplier of Z is earning a positive economic profit 
since Pz = (Px  Py) = (ACRx  ACy) > ACRz.  In fact, many or all of the products that are viable in long-run 
equilibrium—and which therefore satisfy (1)—are likely to be profitable when x = x* and x* < x**.  
Widespread further entry will therefore occur, and long-run equilibrium cannot prevail until this happens. 
 Thus if X survives in long-run equilibrium, this equilibrium must be where x* = x**.  Entry will cause 
x** to fall toward x*, and in order for this to happen, some of the new entrants must supply products that are 
substitutes for X.  Such entrants will lower the demand for X and make this demand more elastic.  They will also 
reduce Fx, which lowers both AC
R
x and x**.  Likewise, entrants that supply substitutes for Z will lower Pz and 
Fz whenever Fz is initially positive.  Let TCx be the total cost of x exclusive of rent.  As long as the demand for 
X is high enough to cover TCx for an efficient supplier of X, this product will continue to be supplied over the 
long run. 
 Since the long-run equilibrium output, x*, is now the output at which ACRx has a zero slope, the supplier 
of X is facing horizontal demand in equilibrium and is a price taker.  Under free entry and exit, its equilibrium is 
indistinguishable from that of a perfect competitor, even though no other firm supplies a product that is a 
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perfect substitute for X, in the sense that the elasticity of substitution between X and any other firm’s product is 
less than infinity.  Moreover, the condition given by Rosen [1974] for perfect competition with product 
differentiation fails to hold.  Here the effect of many substitutes that are imperfect duplicates the effect of many 
perfect substitutes, even when each product has a unique attribute.  The existence of Z extends the competitive 
equilibrium in Y to differentiated substitutes for Y.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
    V.   Conclusion 
 
Given products X and Y plus a third product, Z, that meets the cost-effectiveness condition (1), the long-
run equilibrium output of X at the firm level will be where the average cost of Y reaches its minimum and 
therefore the same as that of Y.  The differentiated version of a product (X) has the same equilibrium output, xe = 
x*, as the non-differentiated version (Y), and the value of x* is wholly determined by technical properties of the 
production function for Y.  When free entry and exit prevail, moreover, and we replace (1) with the slightly 
stronger condition (1a), the equilibrium output, xe, will be where rent-inclusive average cost (AC
R
x) reaches its 
minimum and is therefore indistinguishable from a long-run equilibrium under perfect competition when free 
entry and exit prevail.  This is true even though products are differentiated and each product has a unique attribute 
so that the analysis of Rosen [1974] does not apply. 
NOTES 
 
1. For surveys of models of imperfect competition, see Mansfield and Yohe [2004], Nicholson and Snyder 
[2012], and Shapiro [1989].  See Chamberlin [1933] for the basic model of monopolistic competition. 
2. The market for Y may be vulnerable to “hit-and-run” entry, which causes Y to be priced competitively, even 
though Y is not supplied under perfect competition.  See Baumol [1982].  Also perfect competition is 
compatible with some product differentiation.  See Rosen [1974]. 
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